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ABSTRACT
Through strengthened third-party obligations for data
protection, the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation will export privacy norms. However, developing
economies may want to consider a co-regulatory industry
approach to data protection before adopting similar national
legislation. The General Data Protection Regulation can be an
ideal model for global harmonization of privacy laws, particularly
for adoption among industries and willing participants. To benefit
from a co-regulatory approach, however, a developing economy
would need to invest in education and legal systems in order to
capture the benefits of the growing e-commerce market that will
undoubtedly be influenced by the General Data Protection
Regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2012, the European Union (“EU”) released a
new proposal for data protection that would replace the 1995 Data
Protection Directive.1 This proposal, also known as the General
Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), was adopted in April 2016.2
1

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, COM (2012) 11 final,
(Jan.
25,
2012),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_
en.pdf.
2
Regulation 2016/679 (EU) of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, hereinafter “GDPR
Final
Text,”
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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The GDPR represents the next wave of data protection reform that
will strengthen compliance by third-party subcontractors with
whom data is shared. The GDPR replaces the Data Protection
Directive 95/46/EC (the “Directive”), which was created to
harmonize data privacy laws across the EU member states. Given
the significant technological changes since the Directive was passed
in 1995, the GDPR seeks to preserve EU harmonization while
modernizing data privacy laws. The GDPR includes assurances that
citizens who provide their information with informed consent will
have their information protected even when that information is
shared with third parties. While the GDPR still requires EU member
states to enact harmonizing national legislation, it improves upon
the 1995 Directive by strengthening protections for individual rights
and increases the power of the European Commission over those of
national data protection commissions. By May 2018, all member
states will have nationalized the requirements of the GDPR.3
Through strengthened third-party obligations for data
protection, the European Union’s GDPR will result in the
exportation of privacy norms. However, developing economies
may want to consider a co-regulatory industry approach to data
protection before adopting similar national legislation. Part I of this
Article explains the history and of data privacy law in the
European Union. Part II discusses how the GDPR can lead to the
adoption of data privacy practices in countries without
comprehensive data privacy laws through the private sector. Part
III identifies challenges for developing economies to adopt a
comprehensive regime like the GDPR, and proposes co-regulatory
approach for data privacy.
I.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A LEADER IN PRIVACY AND
SECURITY REGULATION
Soon after the ‘big data’ phenomenon and rise of massive

content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.119.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:201
6:119:FULL.
3
Id.

98 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 12:1

global data collectors enabled by the Internet, privacy became a
major concern among many Western nations. European officials
were quick to respond to growing concerns regarding big data and
privacy with sweeping data protection laws adopted in 1995.
Speculations arose that the EU would become the driver of
international privacy norms.4 For example, in 2001, Joel
Reidenberg, a law professor at Fordham University, testified
before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce that “[i]n
effect, Europe through the European Directive has displaced the
role that the United States held since the famous Warren and
Brandeis article in setting the global privacy agenda.”5 Today, the
European Union has arguably emerged as a leader in the fight to
preserve traditional norms of individual privacy in the digital age.
If any nation—or, as in this case, group of nations—can be
effective at exporting its privacy norms across the globe, it will
likely be the EU.
Until the mid-nineties, each of the EU member states had
unique national privacy legislation.6 However, under this model,
efforts within individual countries to ensure privacy for their
citizen’s data could easily be undermined when that data was
transferred to other member states with weaker data protection
regulations. This prompted the EU to attempt to harmonize data
protection with omnibus privacy laws.7 Unlike the United States,

4

See, e.g., The EU Data Protection Directive: Implications for the U.S.
Privacy Debate: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer
Protection,
107th
Cong.,
at
http://www.house.gov/commerce/hearings/03082001-49reidenberg104/htm
(2001) (testimony of Prof. Joel Reidenberg).
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Ritter, et al., Emerging Trends in International
Privacy Law, 15 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 87, 90–91 (2001) (“The genesis of modern
legislation in this area can be traced to the first data protection law in the world,
enacted in the Land of Hesse in Germany in 1970. That enactment was followed
by national laws with differing objectives and scope in Sweden (1973), the
United States (1974), Germany (1977), and France (1978).”).
7
Directive 95/46 1995 O.J. (L 218) 31 (EC), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML.

2016] PRIVACY HARMONIZATION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 99

which regulates data protection from a sector approach,8 the EU’s
omnibus approach was intended to establish standards for
information law broadly.
In 1995, the European Parliament adopted the EU Data
Protection Directive9 with two major objectives: (1) to protect the
fundamental right to data protection; and (2) to guarantee the free
flow of personal information between member states.10 This latter
goal enabled the European Union to achieve greater harmonization
of data protection by requiring that each Member State enact
national legislation to protect “the fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons . . . .”11 The Directive requires any
EU-based company to comply with specific rules for processing
and transferring European consumer data and further grants those
consumers certain rights and controls with regards to their personal
data, such as the right to be notified of all uses and disclosures
about data collection and processing, and the right to correct or
delete personal data.
The Directive imposes certain privacy requirements on
those who would collect consumer data. It requires, for example,
that companies protect personal information with adequate
security, and companies can only transfer data to other countries
with an “adequate level of protection.”12 This means that European
companies seeking to utilize third-party services in another country
need to ensure that equivalent privacy and security are
implemented by the third-party company in order to transfer
personal data outside of Europe.
Since the adoption of the Data Protection Directive, the EU
has passed other complementary directives that further address the
8

Peter P. Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Foundations of Information Privacy
and Data Protection: A Survey of Global Concepts, Laws and Practices 32
(Terry McQuay ed., 2012).
9
Directive 95/46 1995 O.J. (L 218) 31 (EC), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at art. 25.
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collection and use of personal information issues aggravated by
new technologies. The Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications was established in 2002 to address protections in
electronic mail, telephone communication, traffic data, caller ID,
and spam.13 This directive was then altered by the Data Retention
Directive, which set out minimum and maximum retention
schedules for data.14 The 2009 Amendment Directive, also known
as the Cookie Directive, required that opt-in consent be given for
the use of cookies on a website.15
II.

THE NEW GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION WILL
PUSH EU PRIVACY NORMS TO NON-EU COUNTRIES VIA THE PRIVATE
SECTOR.

In January 2012, the EU released a new proposal for data
protection that would replace the 1995 Data Protection Directive.16
The GDPR was adopted in April 2016.17 The GDPR represents the
next wave of data protection reform that will strengthen
compliance by third-party subcontractors with whom data is
shared. The GDPR replaces the Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC (the “Directive”), which was created to harmonize data
privacy laws across the member states of the European Union.
Given the significant technological changes since the Directive
13

Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 200) (EC) on Privacy and Electronic
Communications, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l24120.
14
Directive 2006/24, 2006 O.J. (L 105) (EC), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32006L0024.
15
Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) (EC), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:337:0011:0036:EN:P
DF.
16
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, COM (2012) 11 final,
(Jan.
25,
2012),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_
en.pdf.
17
See GDPR Final Text at art. 44.
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was passed in 1995, the GDPR seeks to preserve EU
harmonization while modernizing data privacy laws. The GDPR
includes assurances that citizens who provide their information
with informed consent will have their information protected even
when that information is shared with third parties.18 While the
GDPR still requires EU member states to enact harmonizing
national legislation, it improves upon the 1995 Directive by
strengthening protections for individual rights and increases the
power of the European Commission over those of national data
protection commissions. By May 2018, all member states will have
nationalized
the
requirements
of
the
GDPR.19
A. Binding Corporate Rules and Model Clauses
A chief provision of the GDPR is that EU rules must apply
if personal data is handled abroad by companies that actively offer
services to EU citizens or render services to entities in the EU.20
Today, data can comply with European data privacy laws by
requiring contractual commitments from subcontractors to
maintain a reasonable level of security, employ industry standard
security practices, and obey all applicable data security laws. This
approach has been accepted under EU law because current
regulations permit the transfer of personal data to third-party
countries that do not have an “adequate level of protection” if the
protection of privacy and individual freedoms “result from
appropriate contractual clauses.”21
Companies subjected to EU data protection laws have taken
three main approaches: (1) adopting binding corporate rules
(“BCRs”); (2) signing standard contractual clauses also known as
Model Clauses; and (3) waiting for the Privacy Shield, which will
18

Id. (“Consent should cover all processing activities carried out for the
same purpose or purposes. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent
should be given for all of them.”).
19
Id. at art. 51.
20
Id at chapter V.
21
Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 26(2).
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replace the Safe Harbor a new self-certification regime for data
transfers to U.S. processors. For example, in the wake of the U.S.EU Safe Harbor invalidation,22U.S. a few companies implemented
BCRs or signed Model Clauses in an effort to continue doing
business with EU customers and partners.23
Reliance on BCRs and Model Clauses has not been widely
adopted, even by those seeking an alternative to the Safe Harbor.
Fewer than a hundred companies globally have sought to have
their BCRs approved by a national data protection authority. 24 This
is partly due to the time, expense, and effort it takes to get
approval.25 Due to the uncertainty regarding safeguards sufficient
to permit cross-border data transfers—aggravated by the
invalidation of the Safe Harbor—even data protection authorities
are taking a wait-and-see approach until there is clear guidance on
how to comply.26
22

See Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Court
of Justice declares that the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision is invalid,
Court of Justice of the European Union (Oct. 6, 2015), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201510/cp150117en.pdf.
23
See, e.g., Ancestry.com, Ancestry EU Safe Harbor - Privacy Shield
Update, available at http://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/ancestry-eu-safe-harborprivacy-shield (last visited Aug. 12, 2016); see also Daniel Alvarez, Safe
Harbor Is Dead; Long Live the Privacy Shield?, Bus. L. Today, May 2016, at 1,
4 (“Consequently, companies that have been using Safe Harbor must analyze
and implement alternative mechanisms going forward, at least until a new
agreement is reached.”).
24
See European Commission, List of companies for which the EU BCR
cooperation procedure is closed, European Commission – Justice (last accessed
May
22,
2016),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/international-transfers/binding-corporaterules/bcr_cooperation/index_en.htm.
25
See Phillip Rees et al., Transferring Personal Data Outside the EEA:
The Least Worst Solution, 13 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review
66 (2007).
26
See, e.g., Mark Young & Monika Kuschewsky, EU Data Protection
Authorities Enforcement Guidance Post-Schrems, National Law Review, Feb.
21, 2016 (“Senior officials within the Swedish Data Protection Authority are
reported to have put in place an informal enforcement moratorium, the duration
of which is uncertain as ‘for the moment [the Swedish Data Protection Authority
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Compliance with the GDPR will likely still rely on
contractual commitments as a main mechanism to enforce EU
privacy regulations abroad.27 As such, European data controllers
(i.e. the companies collecting consumer information) are
encouraged to require non-EU processors (e.g. subcontractors) to
sign data protection commitments that have been approved by an
EU member state’s data protection authority.28 The GDPR does
this by officially recognizing the use of BCRs and Model Clauses
as appropriate safeguards: “[s]uch appropriate safeguards may
consist of making use of binding corporate rules, standard data
protection clauses adopted by the Commission, standard data
protection clauses adopted by a supervisory authority or
contractual
clauses
authorized by a supervisory authority.”29
B. Enhanced Administrative Fines
Apart from its formal recognition of the use of approved
BCRs and Model Clauses as appropriate safeguards, the GDPR
differs from 1995 Data Protection Directive in its increase in the
size of monetary sanctions for violations.30 For example, severe
breaches may be subjected to fines of “up to 4% of worldwide
turnover.”31 For companies such as Google and Facebook,
violations of the GDPR could be a large as €460 million ($516
million) and €2.3 billion ($2.6 billion), respectively. 32 In addition,
is] not taking any such action.’”).
27
See Manu J. Sebastian, The European Union's General Data Protection
Regulation: How Will It Affect Non-EU Enterprises?, 31 Syracuse J. Sci. &
Tech. L. Rep. 216, 242–43 (2015).
28
See Virginia Boyd, Financial Privacy in the United States and the
European Union: A Path to Transatlantic Regulatory Harmonization, 24
Berkeley J. Int'l L. 939, 993 (2006).
29
GDPR Final Text, Clause 108.
30
See id. at Art 83.
31
James Drury-Smith et al., Two Years to Get Ready – GDPR Adopted,
JD Supra (Apr. 15, 2016), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/twoyears-to-get-ready-gdpr-adopted-56868/.
32
Cyrus Farivar, EU agrees on new law that severely punishes firms for
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each supervisory data authority would have the power to impose
administrative fines and would not be preempted by a fine imposed
by another authority. The GDPR outlines multiple factors that
should aid an authority when determining the appropriate
administrative fine. In the end, however, that the fine is required
only to be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”33
For the GDPR to be effective in exporting data protection
standards, companies will need to believe that data protection
authorities are actively imposing fines or other sanctions. If
companies believe that enforcement is rare, or occurs only in cases
of severe data breaches, companies may feel taking the risk of
enforcement is not worth the investment into strengthened data
protection. Respect for the GDPR is critical to effectuate the
desired level of protection of an individual’s information and
harmonizing global privacy laws. The downstream privacy and
security obligations will encourage compliance as a selling point,
and therefore stimulate investment in data protection.34 This could
create market competition and so motivate other companies to also
implement privacy practices into their operations. However, if the
private sector does not believe in the GDPR’s enforcement, or if
there is a respected dissent against the GDPR that creates
uncertainty of its shelf-life, the pressure to ensure third-party
compliance will remain lax and largely on paper.
With data collectors bearing more risk for the activities of
their subcontractors, the GDPR may have the effect of exporting
European privacy norms through the private sectors seeking to do
violating user privacy, ARS Tᴇᴄʜɴɪᴄᴀ UK (Dec. 16, 2015), available at
http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2015/12/tech-firms-could-owe-up-to-4-ofglobal-revenue-if-they-violate-new-eu-data-law/.
33
GDPR Final Text, Article 83.
34
World Economic Forum & Accenture, Digital Transformation of
Industries: Digital Enterprise, Geneva: World Economic Forum (Jan. 2016, 12),
available at http:// reports.weforum.org/digital-transformation-of-industries/ wpcontent/blogs.dir/94/mp/files/pages/files/digital-enterprisenarrative-finaljanuary-2016.pdf (“The growing use of data will create new opportunities for
businesses in fields such as data analysis, data transparency and cybersecurity. It
will also require higher levels of investment in data security by those companies
collecting, storing and analyzing consumer data.”).
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international business.

106 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 12:1

III.

A MODEL FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES?

The question underlying the GDPR and its downstream
impact on data processors is whether its data protection standards
should serve as a model for non-EU countries, particularly
developing countries without established or robust privacy
regimes. To answer this question, we must consider the pros and
cons of the comprehensive approach taken by the EU embodied in
the GDPR, as well as the realities common among developing
countries, such as potential resources for enforcement.
Four major models for data protection are commonly used
around the world; comprehensive, sectoral, self-regulatory, and
technology-based.35 Comprehensive data protection laws govern
the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information in
both the public and private sectors.36 The sectoral framework
protects personal information by enacting laws that address a
particular industry sector, such as medical records and credit
records.37 The self-regulatory model emphasizes the creation of
codes of practice for the protection of personal information by a
company, industry or independent body.38 The technology-based
model uses technical measures as alternative protections that
reduce the relative importance of administrative measures for
overall privacy protections such as encryption.39
The EU has used the comprehensive model since its 1995
adoption of the Data Protection Directive, and has continued this
approach in the GDPR. The primary benefit of a comprehensive
approach is its installation of an official agency or commissioner
responsible for overseeing enforcement, also known as a data
35

Swire, supra note 6.
David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection:
An International Survey of Privacy, Data Protection and Surveillance Land and
Developments, 18 J. Marshall J Computer & Info L. 1 (Fall 1999).
37
See Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996) (Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act); Pub. L. No. 91-508 (1970) (Fair Credit Reporting Act).
38
An example of a self-regulatory model is the Payment Card Industry
Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) which outlines measures for cardholder data
security.
39
Swire, supra note 6 at 34.
36
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protection authority.40 The data protection authority is also
generally responsible for educating the public on data protection
and also acts as an international liaison for data protection
matters.41
However, the comprehensive approach is not without its
critics.42 The three main criticisms of the one-size-fits all model
are: (1) the costs of the regulations can outweigh the benefits, (2)
the same level of strictness may not be justified for all types of
data, and relatedly, (3) a comprehensive regime may stifle
innovation.43
A. Challenges with a comprehensive approach to privacy
For developing countries, the costs alone may undermine
the integrity of adopting the regulations under the GDPR.44 These
costs will come in the form of cyber liability insurance and the
tools and effort to comply with “consent, data mapping and crossborder transfer requirements.”45 Even if a country were to adopt
comprehensive data protection laws, they might lack the resources
to implement and enforce those laws. Resources would be needed
to fund the enforcing body as well as its costly paperwork,
documentation, auditing, and other requirements. Cost burdens
would affect not only the government but any and all companies
subject to the regulations. At a minimum, companies would be
required to have a designated representative to respond to privacy
40

Id. at 31.
Id.
42
See The European Privacy Officers Forum, Comments on Review of
the EU Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) (Jul. 31, 2002) available
at http://www.epof.org/files/Uploads/Documents/EPOF/EPOF_en2_7.31.02.pdf.
43
Id.
44
See Data Privacy Survey: GDPR Costs and Complexity a Concern,
Barker
Makenzie
(May
4,
2016),
available
at
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/newsroom/2016/05/data-privacy-surveygdpr-costs-and-complexity.
45
Id.
41
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requests and conduct self-assessments.46 As mentioned above,
regulations can only be effective if those regulated believe there is
meaningful enforcement. Therefore, developing countries with
budgetary restraints may not have the fiscal means to meet their
desired privacy ends.
Another key consideration for developing economies is the
barrier to innovation that privacy regulations may present to
burgeoning industries. Similar to the tensions with the use of
controversial energy sources,47 the use of big data spurs tensions
between developed and developing economies.48 For example,
companies such as Google and Facebook, established in the United
States, have undoubtedly flourished from their use of user data.
Anyone seeking to develop a product that utilizes predictive
algorithms49 that are necessarily based on the processing of
personal data would be hard-pressed to succeed under a
comprehensive privacy regime; particularly against competitors
operating in jurisdictions without broad regulations on data use.
B. Weaknesses for developing economies
Apart from the challenges imposed by a comprehensive
approach to privacy, developing nations may also be ill-equipped
to meet GDPR expectations. Developing nations are more likely to
lack technical sophistication, national privacy regimes, or effective
judicial systems. These shortcomings would represent significant
weaknesses for protecting personal information in the data-sharing
chain.50
46

GDPR Final Text, Art. 27.
See E.A. Wrigley, Eɴᴇʀɢʏ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Eɴɢʟɪsʜ Iɴᴅᴜsᴛʀɪᴀʟ Rᴇᴠᴏʟᴜᴛɪᴏɴ
(2010).
48
Rosemary Wyber et al., Big data in global health: improving health in
low- and middle-income countries, World Health Organization (Jan. 30, 2015),
available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/93/3/14-139022/en.
49
Predictive algorithms enable more tailored servicing often associated
with efficiency and product quality. See generally Pedro Domingos, The Master
Algorithm (2015).
50
Swire, supra note 6.
47
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Many developing economies have capitalized on low labor
costs in providing competitive business process outsourcing for
companies. Developing and emerging nations striving to be
premier business process outsourcers are eager to meet the demand
from the growing tech sector. Many companies have taken
advantage of differences in labor costs and have chosen to
outsource business processes such as customer service functions to
developing nations. These processes often require at least minimal
access to customer information.51
1. Technical Inferiority
Technical inferiority is a major hurdle for data processing
companies in developing countries.52 Often this stems from either a
lack of local technical education opportunities or from a migration
of skilled labor—known as a “brain drain”—of a country's
educated youths.53 Even developed nations like the United States
suffer from a shortage of privacy professionals, and
training/certification organizations have been growing in an effort
to meet this need.54 For example, the International Association of
Privacy Professionals was established in 2000 and now boasts over
3,100 individuals holding the Certified Information Privacy
Professional for the United States (CIPP/US) credential.55
However, even this amount falls behind in comparison to the
more-than-4,000 organizations that have workers who are selfcertified under the EU-US Safe Harbor agreement for trans51

See Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designing for Transparency
and Trust, Harvard Business Review, May 2015, available at
https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-data-designing-for-transparency-and-trust.
52
Swire, supra note 6.
53
See, Sunita Dodani & Ronald E LaPorte, Brain drain from developing
countries: how can brain drain be converted into wisdom gain?, J. R. Soc. Med.
98, Nov. 2005, 487–491.
54
See About the IAPP: The world’s largest global information privacy
community, International Association of Privacy Professionals ([DATE LAST
UPDATED/VISITED HERE], available at https://iapp.org/about/.
55
Id.
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continental data transfers. Under a comprehensive model,
encompassing every organization that collects personal
information including employee data, it would be difficult for the
United States to meet the privacy professional need, let alone a
developing nation without equivalent educating bodies.
Similarly, privacy in today’s digital world essentially
requires technical knowledge of industry standard security
practices.56 Despite administrative measures such as privacy
policies for organizational guidance, technical measures are a key
ingredient to sufficient data protection. For some developing
countries, this can be a challenge.57 When a population lacks
reliable access to safe housing, clean water, and health services,
education and investment in cybersecurity training are lesser
priorities. For example, many college students in Kenya only have
access to computers or internet via their universities; those students
who attend universities without those resources must often resort
to internet cafes where usage is charged by the minute.58
However, it is important to acknowledge the spectrum of
developing economies and their varying abilities to have a
technically educated workforce. Romania, for example, is known
for producing strong computer science students and is also
considered a developing economy by the International Monetary
Fund.59 However, a challenge for Romania is keeping their talent
within its borders, even as a Member State of the EU. Brain drain
is a major issue for countries like Romania that invest in education,
but lack the private-sector strength to employ recent graduates.60
56

For example, ISO 27001 and NIST SP 800-53 are two internationally
recognized information security standards which organizations can audit and
certify practices against.
57
See ISO and IEC Developing Country Assistance Efforts, ANSI, August
2005.
58
This is noted from the author’s personal experience in 2007 in Nairobi,
Kenya among students at the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University.
59
International Monetary Fund, Uneven Growth: Short- and Long- Term
Factors, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Oᴜᴛʟᴏᴏᴋ (Apr. 2015), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/pdf/text.pdf
60
Marian Chiriac, Romania Fears Brain Drain as Students Head Abroad,
Bᴀʟᴋᴀɴ
Iɴsɪɢʜᴛ,
Sept
15,
2015,
available
at

2016] PRIVACY HARMONIZATION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD111

However, the demand for stronger data protection could
arguably provide an opportunity for countries that are developed
enough in the education sector to mitigate some losses associated
with brain drain. According to one Romanian technology
journalist, several companies “plan to increase their Romanian
teams by up to 20 percent this year . . . . because security officers
are easier to find there, compared with Western Europe . . . . [and]
skills are competitively priced.”61
Similarly, companies may even prefer to be under the
authority of developing countries that have security expertise but
lack a strong technology industry because they may be more
business-friendly. Like countries that promote themselves as tax
havens, countries which curate political pressure to attract and
keep private sector business may offer more lenient enforcement of
the data protection regulations.62 Technical education remains
important because data protection authorities will still need to be
able to understand how a company’s technology works to avoid
arbitrary determinations.
However, an obvious risk with choosing a developing
country as an enforcing authority may be a lack of political
stability and an abundance of corruption. As such, inferiority in
technical education can make the GDPR an unsavory option for
developing countries because companies would not be able to find
the necessary talent to comply with the GDPR. As a result, such
companies may opt to avoid such local markets. Nevertheless, the
GDPR may offer an opportunity to position a developing country
as a desirable location to anchor a regional business hub, despite
technical inferiority. Companies could prioritize competent
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/many-romanian-students-want-tostudy-abroad-09-24-2015
61
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employees and regulators thirsty for foreign investment. By
adopting the GDPR, a developing country could become an
approved nation for international data transfers.
2. Unsophisticated Judicial Regimes
A comprehensive data protection model would designate an
agency or commissioner as the enforcement mechanism. As
previously discussed, developing economies have some desirable
attributes to companies—typically cost-competitive labor and
accommodating government incentives. However, developing
economies are often also characterized by underdeveloped legal
regimes. While this will not necessarily be a barrier to adopting the
GDPR as a model for national data protection laws, it is likely to
significantly impact the benefits that would flow from it.
Under the GDPR, data subjects would need meaningful access
to a remedy for privacy violations. However, the judicial processes
of a country seeking to comply with the GDPR for purposes of
data transfers from other EU countries could undermine the private
sector’s efforts. Judicial redress for data subjects, for example, was
a primary reason behind the invalidation of the US-EU Safe
Harbor agreement.63 The EU Commission found that there was
insufficient access to the courts under U.S. law.64 Since the
invalidation, the United States Congress has sought to remedy this
gap through legislation.65 In doing so, however, Congress has yet
to mitigate another large concern: government surveillance.
Developing countries without a sophisticated legal regime
are likely to find it difficult to meet the judicial requirements.
Private sector companies in developed countries that have not been
63
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approved for data transfers, or countries seeking to perform data
processing services for international companies, will need to rely
on the use of binding corporate rules or model clauses.66
The private sector’s reliance on contract law raises another
issue regarding unsophisticated judicial regimes. Without a
sophisticated judicial structure, contract breach claims could suffer
from extreme delays and complicated administrative
bureaucracies.67 Notorious for extreme delays among developing
economies is India. Economist Matthieu Chemin of McGill
University investigated the impact of India’s speed in closing cases
and its impact on the Indian economy.68 Under his calculations,
“[i]n India, it takes an average of 2 years to dispose of any case. . .
. Extreme examples of judicial slowness refer to cases taking 47
years to be resolved by which time the plaintiff had died.”69
Chemin’s results indicated that “the speed of courts across Indian
states plays an important role in shaping economic activity in this
important sector of the economy.”70 Important to note, however, is
the impact that an amendment71 to India’s Code of Civil Procedure
had on improving efficiency and decreasing contract breaches in
the country. These changes improved the efficiency of the court by
decreasing the number of cases pending per judge and the average
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case duration.72 Chemin’s research found that speedier courts
“decrease[] the probability to experience a breach of contract,
increases investment, and decrease[] the probability to experience
a shortage of capital.”73
Developing countries that fail to recognize the importance
of judicial efficiency will, in effect, only harm the data processing
companies that exist within their borders and strive to be compliant
with the GDPR through contractual means. Further, by having a
legal system that does not provide avenues for redress for foreign
citizens, efforts to harmonize with the EU’s GDPR will remain
incomplete. Thus, developing countries would be unable to benefit
from its adoption.
3. Eagerness to grow
However, a developing country’s eagerness to grow could
harm its efforts to harmonize with the GDPR if that eagerness
outweighs its efforts to implement data protection measures.74 This
could take place at either the governmental or private sector levels.
If a government becomes too eager to tout itself as progressive on
privacy in an effort to look modernized, or to attract business
without following through, for example, then it is unlikely to be
deemed compliant as an EU data protection /authority.75 This
would create the same results as having an unsophisticated
judiciary.76 Further, eagerness from the private sector to commit to
security promises and practices without substantial compliance
could put not only the company, but the country at reputational
72
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risk. 77
In a free market, businesses will typically seek to provide
services that are better, faster, or cheaper. This in turn benefits the
consumer. However, when it comes to data protection, it is not as
easy to recognize when data protection commitments are being
kept. The majority of consumers only learn that a trusted
organization has not kept up their end of the bargain when a data
breach occurs, spilling personal information onto the internet.78
More often than not, consumers in developing countries are wholly
unaware of the nature of their actual data processors, who are often
third parties outsourced to a more reputable company. Vague and
overly broad privacy notices generally extend to allow the sharing
of personal data to third parties when necessary to provide
services,79 and cost considerations may motivate outsourcing
business processes, such as customer service, to countries with
lower labor costs.
In such a race to the bottom on margins, data processors in
low-cost labor markets would not be incentivized to go above the
bare minimum necessary to do business. Data security is not cheap.
It requires the employment of at least one skilled technician, and
under the GDPR, compliance can be costly.80 As seen in the U.S.EU Safe Harbor program, the ability to self-certify compliance was
previously an acceptable means of compliance.81 Under the Safe
77
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Harbor, companies based in the United States needed only to selfcertify that they implemented the necessary technical and
administrative safeguards to adequately protect the privacy
principles of the EU Data Protection Directive.82 Indeed, the only
requirement was a self-certified statement that the subcontractors
had sufficient security measures in place. It was not required to
seek more from subcontracted data processors. A comprehensive
data security assessment with an audit in the United States can cost
$48,000 on average for the data collector themselves.83 As a result,
trying to extend this level of independent review was often costly
for companies, developing country or not. The further down the
data-sharing chain a data processor lies, the less likely that the
accountability of a data protection regime will come in to verify
security commitments; particularly when the data processor is in a
different country than the original data controller subjected to the
data protection regulations.84
This diminishing verification and accountability structure
can create a similar result as having lax enforcement
mechanisms.85 Weighing the cost against the risk, data processors
may take the gamble. While such behavior is in no way unique to
developing economies, reputational harm would probably be more
dramatic for countries trying to gain a market share in business
process outsourcing. While consumers may not care where the leak
came from, data controllers who hire the data processors will lose
trust in the industry. Consumers’ perceptions of an industry’s
quality will matter in the local economy because they have the
Department
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purchasing power. Just as China battles against issues regarding
the reputation of its product quality,86 developing countries in the
data processing industry may similarly develop reputations for
being secure only on paper. This, in turn, is likely to hurt the
companies who are legitimately implementing compliant data
protection programs.
As companies seek to reduce costs, the data protections
may decrease in quality if investments in data security are reduced.
As discussed in Part II.B., enforcement will be key to compliance.
The GDPR can be a powerful catalyst to enabling foreign
investment if companies in developing countries offer low-cost,
compliant services. Given its reliance on self-certification and the
large cost to verify compliance, however, the quality assurances
could be merely representations without actual implementation of
security measures. On the other hand, if a national government
were to adopt and enforce national laws in line with the GDPR,
their enforcement could enable competition among secure
solutions.
4. Risk of exploitation
Developing economies seeking to gain positions as trusted
data processors may also risk exploitation by more sophisticated
organizations. Companies more experienced in contract law—
either by virtue of being located in more legally sophisticated
jurisdictions or that have superior bargaining power—can take
advantage companies in developing countries, particularly with
pass-through terms that would effectively lay liability for data loss
or leaks on the data processor.87 While this would only be the case
if the data processor were actually to blame, previous discussion
has noted the diminishing incentive to ensure compliance. As such,
86
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this could result in half-hearted efforts to put pressure on actual
compliance beyond contractual protections.
The GDPR seeks to close this exploitation of pass-through
data protection commitments by holding the data controller liable
for the breaches of their data processors in cases where the
enforcing data protection authority determines that the controller
failed to adequately ensure compliance beyond mere contractual
commitments.88
This change in data protection law will undoubtedly
increase accountability among data controllers and data processors
in turn. Although a data controller may seek to recover costs
associated with a breach from subcontractors, controllers will be
incentivized to ensure compliance with contractual commitments
from the outset, or to contract with subcontractors in countries with
reliable judicial regimes where they are more likely to successfully
recover.
C. A Co-Regulatory Approach
Given the costs and broad protections of the GDPR, the
best approach for a developing country is likely to be a coregulatory model. A co-regulatory model emphasizes industry
development of enforceable standards for privacy and data
protection against a backdrop of legal requirements by the
government.89 This approach would be similar to the selfregulatory approach, in that the regulations would be driven by the
industry most affected by international data protection laws.
However, the co-regulatory model would add assurance to data
controllers by having the government acknowledge a breach of
those standards as a contract breach.90 This could show a
developing country's commitment to an industry without having to
stifle innovation in other areas.
A co-regulatory approach would also be more efficient to
implement, since standards would be set by those with expertise in
88
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the regulated area instead of relying on government bodies that
may lack technical skills and knowledge of the area. This
particularly parallels aspects from the sectoral approach used in the
United States by picking and choosing important industries,91 but
unlike the United States, would not be significantly retarded by
government inaction to stay up to date with technological
advances.92
The GDPR could be an ideal model for global
harmonization of privacy laws, particularly for adoption among
industries and willing participants. However, to benefit from a coregulatory approach, a developing economy would need to invest
in education and legal systems in order to capture the benefits of
the growing e-commerce market.93
CONCLUSION
The European Union’s new GDPR will inevitably export
privacy norms beyond the borders of the EU. In the absence of
government regulation, the private sector will become the leading
source of privacy norms in industries that collect personal data,
setting a baseline for competition as well as consumer
expectations. Given the ease with which personal data can now be
shared across country borders and the benefits that can arise from
aggregated data, having consistent protections for personal data
throughout the data processing lifecycle will allow for more ecommerce opportunities and increased consumer protection.
Developing countries with the ability to educate their
youths have the opportunity to benefit from increasing data
security needs globally, and these benefits can be increased if the
country has a trustworthy, pro-business government and an
efficient judiciary. However, if a government continues to struggle
with education, corruption, or inefficient courts, then adopting a
comprehensive privacy or data security regime could hurt even the
91
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well-meaning private sector organizations striving to participate in
international e-commerce. A co-regulatory approach would be an
intermediate step towards a comprehensive model that allows a
nation to roll out a regime with less risk.
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PRACTICE POINTERS





Developing countries seeking to ensure an adequate level
of protection essentially equivalent to that of the EU should
evaluate whether they have the capacity to independently
supervise data protection and provide effective and
enforceable rights through effective administration and
judicial redress.
Data processing companies in non-EU countries should
consider adopting binding corporate rules or standard
contractual clauses.
EU data controllers should perform due diligence of
privacy and data security measures for all data processors
beyond contractual commitments to follow GDPR
requirements.
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